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Introduction: what is “neoliberalism” and is there life after “neoliberalism”? 
 
The broad remit contributors to this collection have been asked to address is the nature of 
post-neoliberal economics. While a post-neoliberal economics does not presuppose a post-
neoliberal economy and society, since a discipline can be oppositional, the need for a post-
neoliberal economics is not just a concern for scholastic failings. It is rather grounded in an 
urgent need to address a world gone wrong, rather than merely a discipline gone astray. 
Neoliberalism may be theory and the world always exceeds the bounds of any given theory, 
but equally neoliberalism is used as a rough and ready referent for an identifiable reality, a 
reality that is observably in crisis and where neoliberalism (its features as theory) have played 
multiple facilitating roles. Over the course of this essay I will be using the term neoliberalism 
as a placeholder along these rough and ready lines in so far as it can serve as a point of 
departure to consider possible futures. My main subject will ultimately be the need to 
reconcile post-neoliberal economics to “climate emergency” and the growing prominence of 
“Green New Deals” (GNDs). But let us begin with some comment on this “neoliberalism”.   
 
The term neoliberalism has not just been quasi-descriptive, the theory has served to 
legitimate a concatenation of policy over several decades since the 1970s. It is, in this sense, 
a project. David Harvey provides perhaps the best known account of neoliberalism: 
 
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and 
free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for 
example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, 
defence and legal structures and functions required to secure private property 
and guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. 
Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, 
health care, social security or environmental pollution) they must be created, 
by state action if necessary. But beyond these task the state should not 
venture. State interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare 
minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful 
interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly 
in democracies) for their own benefit […] Deregulation, privatization and 
withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision has been all too 
common. [And] In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an 
ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide to all human action, and 
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substituting for all previously held beliefs’, it emphasizes the significance of 
contractual relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be 
maximised by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions, 
and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of markets” (Harvey, 
2005: 2-3).         
 
The world, of course, has not stood still since Harvey wrote these words. The UK, for 
example, currently has, by inclination, one of the most right-wing governments of the last 100 
years and certainly since Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, and yet that government has 
accommodated to various forms of intervention that sit awkwardly with Harvey’s original 
account – including early initiatives to reimpose state control of the rail network in England 
and a generalised commitment to “level up” the economy. President Biden, meanwhile, 
recently pronounced “trickle down” economics a failure and is seeking to turn the US 
economy towards a Green New Deal and massive infrastructure investment and welfare 
reform with a leading role for the state. 
 
Given there is a difference between theory and reality and given theorists argue that 
neoliberalism is a project it would, however, be misrepresentation to suggest proponents of 
the concept of neoliberalism have a reductive sense of its characteristics. Proponents, such 
as Philip Mirowski, tend to emphasise that a key feature of neoliberalism has been its 
variation and opportunistic malleability (Mirowski, 2013). Proponents of Marxist influenced 
state theory and particularly those influenced by the French regulation school, such as Bob 
Jessop emphasise its role as an ideational framework or “political capitalism” through which 
(as Mirowski also notes) capitalism responds to its own crises, enabling spatio-temporal 
“fixes” (a term favoured by Harvey) that perpetuate the accumulation process.
3
 Similarly, 
Jamie Peck argues that as the project spreads it evolves, hybridises and “fails forward” (Peck, 
2013). This range and flexibility, of course, inevitably leads to the criticism that the term itself 
becomes meaningless, since it becomes a catchall concept – “loose” in a pejorative sense 
rather than referring to meaningful adaptions and evolutions (a debate explored by Bruff and 
Tansel, 2019). But for theorists such as Harvey, Jessop or Peck the term has always been 
conditional, critical and used under advisement along with various other ways of addressing 
capitalism. Nothing in their work suggests that it becomes impossible to distinguish a 
neoliberal and a post-neoliberal world. In any case, it is consequences over recent decades 
rather than tentative signs of possible reversal in the type and degree of legitimate state 
activity that is most significant in getting us to where we are now. 
 
 
So, where exactly are we?  
 
To reiterate I am not suggesting the state of the world reduces merely to a theory of 
neoliberalism – a state-led project of marketisation conjoined with a shift to increasing 
emphasis on individual responsibility, while favouring the interests of capital and corporations. 
I am suggesting that this theory has been a significant thread in producing the state of the 
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world as we know it and in the end it is the state of the world that concerns us far more than 
the theory only. “Is there life after neoliberalism?” implies a problematic state of the world in 
which this project has played some significant role. Let’s consider some familiar markers for 
that “state of the world”. 
 
While neoliberal theory has never been an adequate account of human agency or of social 
reality, it has dominated discourse over the past forty years in which various effects on the 
organisation of economy and society have been observed. Computerisation and information 
processing facilitated a “third industrial revolution”, which transformed  communication, 
administration, bureaucracy, management systems, networks, finance and (conjointly with 
robotics) production lines. However, while connectivity has grown, market competition has 
not, at least in any simple sense, since the period has been dominated by the emergence of 
oligopolistic activity from huge multinational enterprises who combine offshoring and 
outsourcing, in complex global value chains. International trade has grown as a proportion of 
aggregate economic activity, production processes and labour profiles have become post-
Fordist and ownership has become enmeshed in a broader process of “financialisation” as 
finance has grown in scope, scale, complexity and influence. And one might note there are 
quite different takes on the last forty years…     
 
 
On the one hand… 
 
On the one hand, there is a strand of thinking that suggests the past forty years has been one 
of progressive civilisational change: the collapse of highly oppressive regimes in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, a general increase in the number of democratic countries, the 
“opening” of China, a long period of economic growth within a growth in economic 
globalisation; a collective commitment to pervasive development via the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) under 
the auspices of the UN, and achievement of various of those initial goals – a major decline in 
extreme poverty, increases in proportions of the world population receiving a primary 
education (especially girls); growth in access to sanitation, clean water, family planning and 
medical services and so on. From this point of view, overall the world is bursting with 
progressive achievements – though much of this is under-appreciated since our perception is 
distorted by a news system that favours the scandalous, vicious, violent and disastrous or 
“the bad over the good”.       
 
Moreover, science and technology have made incredible advances in the last forty years that 
have transformed science fiction into fact. A fabulous array of distractions, entertainments, 
experiences, goods and services are available and while instant gratification is a norm of 
questionable value it requires a dour distortion of the protestant ethic to prefer a world without 
this array of marvels – though more needs to be said about this. In any case, change has not 
been merely frivolous, all human knowledge can now be at our fingertips… and that 
knowledge extends to amazing advancements across the sciences, including medical science 
and the latter has, in turn, helped extend life expectancy, as has transformations in farming 
and nutrition. Moreover, we have not just extended life expectancy, recognition has extended. 
Though there is nothing new about the idea of intrinsic value or dignity of human personhood 
and thus the case for equality of rights before the law, during the last forty years the 
normative power of this claim has grown cumulatively and ideas to the contrary have become 
ever more defensive or evasive – albeit this too is something about which more needs to be 
said (see later). In any case, it is for all these reasons and various others that there is a strand 
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of thinking (Pinker, 2012 etc.) that suggests as a collective our species has never been safer, 
better educated, long lived or peaceful – that possible lives are open to us that not even kings 
could dream of. This, leads to the inevitable “on the other hand” that complements  any use of 
the phrase “On the one hand”.   
 
 
On the other hand… 
 
So, on the other hand, while, according to the World Bank, the global economy has expanded 
in value from GDP $9.971 trillion in 1979 to $87.735 trillion in 2019, the rate of economic 
growth has slowed compared to the prior post World War II period in both the global North 
and global South (especially if China is taken as a separate distorting case). Moreover, 
reference to a global North and global South serves to highlight that development has been 
uneven and discriminatory. As the work of Robert Wade, Jason Hickel and various others 
indicates few countries have transitioned into the upper echelons of wealthy countries – just a 
handful mainly in East Asia among more than 190 UN members and the overall relation 
between the global North and global South (though beginning earlier than the neoliberal 
period) has seen a transfer of wealth from poorer to richer countries (Hickel et al 2021).
4
 
There is a manifest structural divide that tends to keep some places poorer than others and 
development as “catch-up” is illusory (Wade, 2020; Hickel, 2017). Those places that have 
become manifestly wealthier have all had exploitable special circumstances combined with 
some form of developmental policy that bears little resemblance to the prescriptions of 
neoliberalism – notably its core economics of free movement of capital and exploitation of 
comparative advantage within free markets. In any case, while it is important not to denigrate 
the difference that even small changes make in situations of extreme poverty, the Millennium 
Development Goals represent an extraordinarily low bar for development achievements when 
one considers systematic effects within a “Washington consensus” context such as the 
withdrawal from constructive structural reform (to land ownership etc.) and replacement by 
destructive structural oppression (monetary and fiscal, where conditionality has been imposed 
over the neoliberal period).
5
 The “Washington consensus” may have been modified in recent 
years but there is more continuity than disjuncture and this is also the case for the 
Sustainable Development Goals. The SDGs have emerged in a period where there is growing 
recognition of a planetary crunch point produced by the form and trajectory of economies and 
yet the SDGs essentially prescribe more of the same – built around growth, technological 
fixes, education and human capital but without fundamentally questioning the structuring of 
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If one considers the form and trajectory of economies then economic growth over the last 
forty years in the global North has involved the diversification of consumption, a general 
increase in the proportion of final consumption as a constituent of economic value and a 
growing significance of consumer goods and services in economic activity. Concomitantly 
employment has transitioned into retail, leisure, tourism and hospitality, distribution, cultural 
goods (including digital components such as gaming), construction and services, especially 
financial services. Notably, wages and incomes have slowed and wages are a smaller 
proportion of larger economies,  but this has generally combined with greater levels of imports 
for consumer goods (matching the growth of international trade as a proportion of total 
economic value on a global scale).
7
 As such, importation of consumer goods (and also some 
foodstuffs from industrial farming) produced at lower costs has partially underpinned growing 
consumption – for example, despite slowdowns in wages and incomes the global North 
consumes (per capita) more clothes annually than in the past and buys more food, but both 
are smaller proportions of income than in the 1970s. Besides this background deflation, 
consumption and economic growth have also been underpinned by increases in personal 
debt and thus debt-dependence facilitated by a system of liberalised finance, and finance has 
become a significant sector in itself, not just offering a wider variety of debt products to 
individuals and corporations but also morphing into a complex finance system, producing and 
trading a host of financial assets and instruments in “shadow banking” chains.
8
   
 
 
For critics of neoliberalism… 
 
From the point of view of neoliberalism as a project, however, the real significance of all of 
this is as a politicised “spatial fix” of capital accumulation. Beneath these changes lies a shift 
in relative power from labour to capital, productive capital to finance and with a greater share 
of economic value flowing to capital and less to labour. The shift, however, is not a matter of 
momentary coincidence, rather it reflects conjunctural convergence of preferences of powerful 
actors whose interests have won out and this is reflected in an array of systemic features built 
into globally and regionally powerful organisations and institutions, from the WTO, the IMF 
and World Bank, to the EU (with its single market and sub-sectoral Eurozone) etc. – there is a 
price of entry, a price of membership, a price to be paid if rules are violated – defaults are 
made, restructurings requested, ownership contested, etc. And while it is important not to 
suggest the global South is homogenous or lacks agency, in the last forty years different 
countries in the global South have played a variety of roles: as a peripheral location into which 
speculative capital during periods of excess can flow (with the perpetual threat of destabilising 
those economies), as a source of low cost labour for offshoring and outsourcing initiatives 
(especially as an infrastructure of global transportation has emerged around containerisation, 
special economic zones and highly automated logistically efficient mega-ports and especially 
as technology has enabled simplified modular production enabling low cost sites to diversify 
from clothing etc. and into hi-tech assembly), as a source of primary commodities (which in 
turn become a source of speculative activity for a host of financial organisations) fuelling 
industrialisation and urbanisation, as a site to process or just dump the waste products of the 
world (the “illth” of wealth that is otherwise given positive economic value in our curious 
system of accounting, despite the concept of negative externalities) and finally as a set of 
emerging consumer markets.  
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From the point of view of neoliberalism as a project then, this “spatial fix” has provided the 
latest manifestation of capitalism’s intrinsic need to grow intensively and extensively – and 
one does not need to be a Marxist to note that Marx and Engels described this priapic 
globalising feature (without using the term capitalism) eloquently in the Communist Manifesto 
in 1848. The process is, of course, somewhat different than they could observe at the time 
since corporations, services and final consumption are more significant; in any case, 
economies industrialise, incomes grow, a middle class emerges, society changes, 
consumption becomes more widespread, the economy becomes service-oriented, and under 
the auspices of corporations, governments, and supranational organisations industrialisation 
is shifted to other countries; there is continuous domestic economic expansion and this 
spreads to those other countries, which have in turn industrialised and who then seek to 
emulate the consumption pattern of “advanced” countries.
9
 Here, there is much more that 
might be said about space, place and difference – regarding varieties of capitalism, growth 
models, authoritarian hybridisations, the nature of a monetary economy etc. and 
metaphorically speaking a great deal of ink has been spilled on these debates by post 
Keynesians, radical political economists and global political economists and so on, but in a 
“rough and ready sense” the previous paragraphs ought to be recognisable as a confluence 
of tendencies and as generally observable manifestations – the state of the (“neoliberal”) 
world. The point though is that this “state of the world” leads to a quite different set of 
identifiable negative characteristics and points of emphasis than the more positive “underlying 
progress” way of describing the past forty years – an “On the other hand”…  
 
As the IMF notes, there have been several hundred financial and banking crises since the 
1970s, of which the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 is only one (if, obviously, the 
most widespread). For theorists of financialisation, these are not unforeseeable “shocks”, but 
rather manifestations of a pathological system of unstable growth built around debt cycles. 
The austerity response to this situation combined with a renewed commitment to “financial 
deepening” with relatively little change to the purpose of banking and finance has exposed 
and/or exacerbated a host of identifiable characteristics. Over the last forty years the increase 
in the relative share of capital to labour in economic value has been paralleled by the growth 
of extreme wealth and income inequality.
10
 This has varied by country but is observable to 
some degree almost everywhere, as is some degree of erosion of collective rights and 
representation of workers and reduction in spending on and narrowing of provision of welfare. 
The last ten years have intensified the effects of this in the global North: an increase in 
working poverty, a proliferation of adverse and previously atypical working conditions and 
practices (zero-hour and flexible work contracts, platform-based pseudo self-employment, 
punitive use of sub-contraction etc.), job insecurity and a more generalised anxiety regarding 
the perpetual threat of hardship that spreads far beyond those living and working 
“precariously” or those living in easily identifiable areas of longstanding deindustrialisation. 
The Covid-19 pandemic, meanwhile, has again exposed the structural fragilities of 
contemporary society and economy – those compelled to work by penury and precarity who 
were then exposed to the virus, those working in social care, public transport, delivery and 
nursing hailed as heroes in the press but treated as dupes in their pay packets – the 
spectacular increase in wealth of the few, the scope for those few to grow their wealth with 
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A world gone wrong…  
 
Clearly, if one compares the strand of thinking that highlights the positives of the last forty 
years and that which highlights the negative, they are not discussing different worlds. Rather 
they have different emphases and the negative – to state the obvious – takes a critical stance 
whereas the positive tends to implicitly work within the limits of the system as is. Importantly 
though, criticism is not “news from nowhere”, it is not free floating. Rather, it is rooted in 
proposed explanatory mechanisms or sets of structural relations with attendant powers and 
potentials, which become ways of acting that ingrain tendencies and consequences.  
 
So, we may have made amazing progress in some forms of science and technology and this 
has created possibilities in the world but we have done so in a system where we do not just 
use these technologies and their offspring, we consume them and we do so in a system of 
consumerism.
12
 Goods are designed to be instantly disposable, short term, fashionable or 
seasonal, unrepairable, rapidly obsolete, and readily replaced according to any of a number 
of rationales, most of which encourage us to value the momentary process of consumption 
i.e. the act of acquisition over the long term use in ownership. With this come socialised 
identities and lifestyles that can never be settled because the very point is to keep us 
engaging in consumption. The psychology here is subtly different than merely acknowledging 
that there can be something valuable or entertaining in the use of goods or services. It 
requires a narrative that whispers we are incomplete, dissatisfied and restless and the next 
act of consumption will either distract us from that sense or be the thing that momentarily 
completes us – and, of course, marketing, advertising and the various strategies that 
manufacture demand are not new, but they are more pervasive in a contemporary “consumer” 
society where it is the diversity and volume of consumption that keeps the economy going. 
 
Moreover, “keeping the economy going” implicates a whole set of structural dynamics. Again, 
a subtle difference of perspective arises, this time between an economy which allows us to 
use what we create in fulfilling ways and an aberrational or adverse structuring of purpose 
and the hierarchy of what matters – human well-being or keeping the economy going? In any 
case, a reappraisal of what might otherwise look like progress leads to an expanding set of 
questions regarding the role and purpose of consuming and how it is embedded in an 
economy and its employment relations and how this in turn is embedded in a society and an 
“environment”. Capitalism has always been an accumulation process, but since the advent of 
macroeconomics and the collection of macro data it has become more oriented towards 
policy that targets continuous growth and neoliberalism has worked with this. So, the 
question, “what have we done with the amazing advances in science and technology and with 
forty years of time?” might be answered with, learned to consume more and faster within 
throwaway cultures which demand work for the purposes of keeping the economy going and 
where growth has become the explicit goal as though this was the necessary correlate of 
“progress”. The collateral damage of these observable mechanisms and trends has been 
debt-dependence, pressurised working lives that increasingly damage mental and physical 
health and observable distributional consequences. As numerous data sources indicate, the 
vast majority of increases in economic value have been captured by a few well-positioned 
corporations and persons. Concomitantly, in socio-economic terms, the GFC and its 
aftermath have seemingly intensified a longer trend decline in social mobility – and this has 
occurred across the OECD and is most observable as an inter-generational decline. So, for 
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critics of neoliberalism, looking at the state of the world is to see a “rigged system”: one which 
genuflects to aspiration and hard work, and valorises wealth creation while enabling 
opportunistic wealth capture, one that privileges the few among the many in the global North 
and then the global North over the global South…  
 
Unsurprisingly then, the post-GFC period has witnessed growing cynicism and questioning of 
the legitimacy of the system(s) we live in: in the US and UK, for example, competent and 
principled politicians are seen as the exception not the rule, and venal self-serving mendacity 
is expected from, rather than reviled when exhibited by, politicians (who claim they take “full 
responsibility” and then neither resign or change their behaviour). A negatively inflected 
concept of “elite” has entered ordinary language use, referring to a privileged few (and Left 
and Right have quite different ideas of who these are), while more pointed terms such as 
oligarchy, plutocracy and kleptocracy have also entered the lexicon and are deployed to 
connect people and places as far flung as Moscow, London and Lagos, the Cayman Islands 
and Wall Street… The notion that expertise carries authority has also come into question, 
partly through reduction to or conflation with plunder of the state and the corrosion of public 
standards.
13
 There is a sense that expertise is less about vocation and sense of public service 
and more about careers, opinions for hire, revolving doors, maintenance of any observable 
status quo and “justifying” the unjustifiable. And all of this has been readily weaponised 
through social media – whose attention-scoring algorithms isolate, silo and augment what our 
“clicks” suggest we want, and whose rules of communicative engagement can be quite 
different than face-to-face conversation might create. No fact is immune from a strongly 
worded belief and no conspiracy is too absurd to be denied replication. All human knowledge 
may, in principle, be at our fingertips, but new technology has intensified old problems of IP 
ownership in the context of monetisation of data as digital currency.   
 
In any case, the neoliberal era seems to have killed one of democracies most important 
ideological tenets – the idea of meritocracy. Race, gender and class have always mattered – 
and so the idea of meritocracy has never been without its critics – but the abuse and 
transmission of privilege now hide in plain sight, even as norms have turned to diversity. And 
division and diversity have proven quite capable of angry co-existence. Perhaps most 
significantly, reactions against the sense of a rigged system have themselves been politically 
divisive – blame shifting, popularism, strident nationalisms and so on. One of the great ironies 
of this is that the Right has undermined the Left’s traditional claim to be about solidarity and 
the Right has used this to peel off traditional elements of support – via: they don’t care about 
“real people”, they don’t speak for you, they patronise you while serving themselves – ironic 
since the main architects of this can hardly make the counterclaim that they demonstrably 
care more. Ultimately then, the sense of progress through extended recognitions one might 
otherwise associate with the last forty years looks frayed – as different groups adopt the 
language of “culture wars” and contest identities, authenticities and the right to speak and be 
heard. Social fracture then, seems particularly pronounced today – albeit this looks different in 
places like the USA, Russia, Hungary, Brazil and the UK than it does in Sweden, Germany or 
elsewhere. Overall though, there is widespread discussion of democracy rotting from the 
inside and democracy in retreat.      
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“The diabolical double crisis” 
 
The suggestion of a “world gone wrong” brings us to contemporary discussion of solutions. 
The ultimate context here is that the “neoliberal” decades have rendered economies 
individually and collectively more resource and energy hungry and waste creating. This does 
not imply all people and places are equally sources of or responsible for this. Clearly, a 
growth in world population from around 4.4 billion in 1979 to about 7.8 billion in 2020 cannot 
be without consequence, but it is a fraction of the world’s population, a few countries and a 
small coterie of corporations that are responsible for the majority of resource and energy use 
– with some variation if one takes a longer historic-cumulative or contemporary approach (the 
latter also includes China and to a lesser extent India). In any case, according to Earth 
System scientists we have now entered a new post-Holocene epoch, the Anthropocene – 
where it is humans (or more accurately economic systems developed by our species – 
leading to further terms, such as the “Capitalocene”) who are the decisive influence on the 
planet. Climate and ecological breakdown are now well advanced and using the “planetary 
boundaries” (PB) framework, we have in the last forty years transgressed the “safe operating 
parameters” of 3 (in work published 2009) then 4 (in work published 2015) and (as of 2021) 
likely 6 of 9 processes, which in combination comprise the Earth System.
14
 During the 
Holocene each of these processes maintained itself as a complex system within broadly 
stable limits – our activity, however, has acted to create forcing effects, leading to potential 
positive feedbacks, pushing processes out of these stabilisation situations.  
 
The most well-known of these PBs is effects on the climate system from greenhouse gas 
(GHGs) emissions. The main metric for this is parts per million (ppm) by volume atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. The pre-industrial revolution level is typically reported as 280 ppm. Increased 
atmospheric CO2  and equivalents lead to heating of the planet and this is calculated using 
“climate sensitivity” measures (the increase in average global temperature per doubling of 
atmospheric CO2 above the pre-industrial level i.e. an increase from 280 ppm to 560 ppm). 
Calculations are estimations and currently put likely heating between the lower end of 2C+ 
and around 4C per doubling in the next generation of models (which are likely to comprise 
the sixth IPCC “assessment report” due 2022), though the consensus is that greater heating 
effects cannot be discounted. This has led  some climate and Earth System scientists to posit 
an irreversible “Hothouse Earth” scenario along PB lines. Moreover, adverse effects, such as 
greater frequency and severity of extreme weather events, are being observed at lower than 
anticipated average temperatures (global average heating is currently about 1.2C above the 
pre-industrial level)
15
 and consensus is growing that the increase in atmospheric CO2 is riskier 
for the climate system’s effects than previously anticipated. The 2009 PB work set a “safe” 
boundary at 350 ppm to ensure that stabilisation effects would win out and future temperature 
rises were likely to stay below 1C , but reported a contemporary figure of 387  ppm.  
 
However, the direction of travel is not only still moving away from the 350 ppm boundary but 
seems set to exceed a global “carbon budget” consistent with both 1.5C and 2C in the 
relatively near future, with projections estimating rises of 3C and higher through the rest of 
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the century and into the next. The UK Met Office estimates 417 ppm for 2021, which is 30 
ppm higher than the 2009 figure and 50% higher than the pre-industrial level and while it took 
around 200 years for a 25% increase it took just the last 30 for this to kick on to 50% in our 
resource and energy hungry and waste creating world. According to the 2020 UNEP eleventh 
“emissions gap” report, meanwhile, annual global emissions reached a record high in 2019 of 
between 52.4 and 59.1 gigatons (Gt) CO2 and equivalents (depending on the measure, and 
with fossil fuel emissions estimated at 38 GtCO2 – also a record high). The Paris Agreement 
December 2015 set the goal of keeping heating well below 2C, and ideally at 1.5C (Article 2 
(1a)). And it is because of growing concern regarding meeting the goals that the IPCC in its 
2018 special report called for a 45% reduction in global carbon emissions on 2017 levels by 
2030 with a view to “net-zero” by mid-century. In any case, we have now entered a period of 
recognised “climate emergency” that demands rapid and pervasive “decarbonisation” (which 
is to say nothing of the need to address the wider range of ecological destructions and 
disruptions to the biosphere) and this has translated into a host of initiatives.
16
   
 
Climate and ecological issues have always involved an odd conflation between economy as 
the source of the vast majority of problems and economic activity as the motor or mechanism 
of any solution to those problems. As most readers will be aware, over the last forty years, 
environment and sustainability have been mainly framed as economic costs to be 
incorporated (as “negative externalities”) and managed, as property rights that can be 
exploited once recognised (in “carbon trading” markets) and as, via technology, a subject for 
diversification of economic activity and subsequent “dynamic efficiency” effects i.e. a business 
opportunity – and dominant modelling systems for “scenario pathways” work with this as 
background, using “damage functions” and concepts like “social cost of carbon” to estimate 
lost GDP growth within an otherwise growing economy (in turn used in conjunction with 
“discount rates” to influence policy timing for mitigation and adaptation initiatives – and these 
ultimately treat heating of the planet as a manageable cost-benefit problem – leading to odd 
terms such as “optimal warming”).  
 
In UNEP discourse and elsewhere during the last thirty years or so, solving climate and 
ecological problems has been typically referred to as moving beyond “business-as-usual” and 
yet the UNEP ten-year emissions gap summary report states that total global emissions 
towards the end of the last decade were about what they would have been had there been 
“no policy” (Christensen and Olhoff, 2019). The main response to this has been for most 
contributors to policy and debate across the political spectrum to call for greater urgency of 
action and more rapid investment in the form of variants of “Green New Deals” (GNDs). 
These envisage a transformed energy and transport infrastructure based on electrification 
and renewables, major changes to agribusiness and land management (e.g. extensive tree 
planting) and a new manufacturing sector harnessing the latest (“fourth industrial 
revolution”)
17
 technology to produce within a more “circular economy” for a more ecologically 
aware consumer, eating differently and living in new or retrofitted lower impact or climate 
resilient housing stock.
18
 The more corporate-friendly version of this envisions some minor 
modification to “business-as-usual”, but there is also a more radical version of GNDs. Both, in 
different ways, invite the question, are they capable of solving the fundamental problem at 
hand? i.e. the scale and impact of economic activity on the planet. Here, it is important to 
keep in mind the obvious fact that one does not negotiate with the planet, one either does 
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what is necessary to maintain its parameters within limits which are conducive to life (as we 
and other species know it), or one does not. A post-neoliberal world then, requires some 
reconciliation between what must change to address climate emergency and ecological 
breakdown and what we want to change about the system that got us to where we are.  
 
For our purposes it is the radical version of GNDs which are more interesting, since these 
seek system transformation but still invoke what Andrew Sayer refers to as a “diabolical 
double crisis” dilemma – a tension between solving the climate crisis and solving the crisis of 
highly unequal socio-economies.
19
 The more radical version views GNDs as an opportunity to 
address the observed pathologies of globalised neoliberalism. Given that the last forty years 
have encouraged market-based solutions to climate and ecological problems and these have 
manifestly failed to transcend “business-as-usual”, the more radical approach to GNDs 
envisages far greater scope for the state, and public spending and policy intervention to lead 
and shape major investment initiatives. Curtailing the adverse effects of extreme inequality 
provides a justification for a more steeply progressive approach to tax policy (including carbon 
taxes and forms of policy that are most disruptive to fossil fuel interests) and new forms of 
wealth taxes on the very rich, allowing for redistribution as well as financing of investment 
(though this is dependent on whether one is more or less an advocate of modern monetary 
theory).
20
 Thereafter, the basic rationale is that “greening” the economy offers the prospect of 
higher skilled jobs in transformative industries, in turn encouraging renewal of domestic 
manufacturing etc. – and it is supposed that this will reverse some of the prior “offshoring” 
trend, leading to “reshoring” or reindustrialisation, a shift in the balance of trade between 
imports and exports with greater scope for exports and, most importantly, employment growth 
in higher value-added sectors with greater job security – creating a virtuous circle of higher 
demand for and greater bargaining power placed with,  skilled labour and thus higher wages 
and incomes, whose further consequence via multiplier effects is greater capacity to fund and 
support better standards of social care, retirement and welfare systems, as well as a “pre-
distribution” effect that reduces the need for debt dependencies and thus some aspects of 
financialisation (providing, inter alia, for a political renewal of “faith in the system”).  
 
Clearly, then, radical GNDs run counter to many of the observed features of neoliberalism 
and thus offer a vision of a post-neoliberal world (albeit one with a mainly global North theme 
and perhaps presupposing some kind of “winning out” in global competition to dominate green 
technologies). At base, however, radical GNDs are, in the main, contemporary versions of the 
Keynesian approach to reforming national capitalism, built in this case around “green growth” 
as a solution to climate emergency. While offering an alternative to many of the features of 
neoliberalism is obviously an attractive prospect, the problem, however, is that the growth 
aspect of GNDs sits awkwardly with the material limits of the world. Sayer expressed the 
problem concisely in his Why We Can’t Afford the Rich and this predates the transition from a 
dire climate situation to declared climate emergency (and so has only become more relevant):  
 
Given that the rise of the rich and the related slowdown in the growth of 
ordinary people’s wages and salaries have, together, stalled the global 
economy, slowing the growth of demand and restricting opportunities for 
profitable productive investment, we should cut off or tax the rich’s sources of 
unearned income and redistribute wealth downwards [as well as facilitate 
more equal wealth and income across society, which eventually reduces the 
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need to redistribute]. This would boost demand and allow economic growth to 
resume… In other words, redistribution plus growth [it seems at first sight] is 
the answer… [But] such a policy would accelerate global warming, indeed it 
would make runaway global warming and its dire consequences inevitable… 
We are therefore in a diabolical double crisis (Sayer 2015: 327)…  
 
[W]e can’t afford to perpetuate an economic system predicated on inequality 
and endless compound growth. The dream of ‘green growth’, with capitalism 
delivering sustainability, is like selling guns to promote peace (Sayer 2015: 
341). 
 
There may be a difference between material growth and economic growth (since the latter is 
a measure of value in exchange of goods and services in some currency), but ultimately an 
economy is a material process. It uses energy to transform some things into others, and this 
requires use of resources and waste creation. The bigger an economy is the more energy and 
resources it tends to use and waste it creates. There is no evidence that “decoupling” (in the 
form of energy intensity $GDP measures etc.) can offset the observable effects of continually 
expanding the scale and intensity of economic activity as we know it, and while there may be 
some scope for “efficiency”, an economy cannot be “immaterial”.
21
 We live on a finite planet. 
As such, as ecological economists and activists have argued for years, targeting continual 
economic growth is to target the impossible and invite disaster. We are now in a situation 
where we have hit and in some cases exceeded limits. Our energy systems are a key 
component in this, but even if these could be transitioned to non-fossil-fuel forms (and the 
evidence is against this being possible at current scales in the relevant timelines), great 
swathes of economy are built around carbon and generate emissions (fertilizers, meat, 
concrete, steel, plastics, synthetic textiles etc.). As such, more growth cannot be the answer 
to our state of the world and “green growth” is in essence an oxymoron when applied on a 
planetary scale, given the situation we are now in.  
 
The implication then, is that imagining, organising and arguing for the kinds of post-neoliberal 
socio-economies we might want has to start by recognising what is prudential and feasible. 
GNDs of any stripe cannot ignore this since massive investment to transform the energy and 
transport infrastructure etc. as a way to renew employment and kick start multipliers invokes 
growth across the existing system, with its other corporations offering goods and services in 
an existent economy with socialised tendencies that encourage consumption – higher wages 
and incomes readily lead to renewal here too. GNDs without some explicit recognition of 
“enough is enough” risk default towards a “technofix”, since they leave unreconciled the basic 
systemic problems of a growth imperative, consumerism and accumulation.  
 
“Progressives” are as subject to physical reality as anyone else. This is why advocates of 
degrowth, postgrowth, social ecological economics and some variants of steady-state 
economics, argue we need to stop acting like we have choices we don’t have.
22
 This, in turn, 
leads to the issue of what kind of economics can recognise limits, adequately express the 
nature of economy and still work to address the problematic features of neoliberalism…   
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An economics that is fit for purpose  
 
If climate emergency indicates anything, it is that we are urgently in need of an economics 
that is “fit for purpose”. Consider what “fit for purpose” now means. An adequate economics 
now has to be one that helps us understand the difficult decisions that are likely to confront us 
in the coming years. On a global scale we are going to have to leave fossil fuels in the 
ground, restore aquifers and water systems, reinvigorate ecosystems, greatly accelerate 
reforestation, bring a halt to using the oceans as a dumping site for plastics and numerous 
other chemical pollutants, reduce acidification of the oceans and so on. But fundamentally, on 
a global scale we are, unless there is some miraculous technological miracle, going to have to 
do less. That means we cannot continue with throwaway consumerism or with continual 
economic-material-energy growth. We are going to have to use durable, replaceable and 
repairable goods, but more fundamentally we are going to have to consider our consumption 
decisions differently in regard of whether we buy something at all – since this seems basic to 
“low impact living”. This, however, is antithetical to both the system as is and the mechanisms 
and interests that currently “keep the economy going”. I may be able to choose not to buy or 
fly but I cannot create income, employment and alternatives to employment on a system-wide 
basis – nor can I know unaided whether in fact the sum total of activity is within feasible 
planetary limits domestically and globally. Only the state in its relations with other states and 
in its relations with the private sector can know and do these things – working to create the 
pathways of feasible transition and transformation that parallel activity from all other aspects 
of society. And yet states are caught between their current evolved and developed interest 
configurations derived from the neoliberal period and the necessity to address profound and 
basic problems. Furthermore, there is no such thing as a “self-annihilating corporation” and 
there is considerable resistance from any industrial sector to recognition that its time has 
come. 
 
The implication then, is that any adequate economics must recognise the politicised dilemmas 
of socio-economic organisation. It cannot evade political economy. It cannot evade discussion 
of the norms that inform the structuring of economy and the mechanisms that induce 
consequences from those structurings. In any case, only the state can configure its GND to 
what the world really allows and we are going to have to think about what preserves and 
stabilises the world, which is a radically different perspective than commodifying it as 
resources to exploit. And we are going to have to act and act quickly. That something can be 
phrased as cannot be “evaded” “must” or “have to”, of course, does not mean we will treat 
things that way and this too is a dilemma – resisting the obvious and refusing to deliberate will 
not prevent adverse outcomes, it merely increases the likelihood that worst cases become 
inevitabilities.    
 
While these are not new ideas and certainly not original to me – they are now the reality that 
confronts us, a reality that mainstream economics has been antithetical to, since it has  
encouraged unsustainable trends in almost all aspects of economy: climate and resource 
profligacy (via “growthism” and approaches to theory that have invited complacency regarding 
if and when to accept that “enough is enough”), extreme inequality, insufficient attention to 
basic human services, well-being, profit over public purpose, and so on.
23
 As advocates of 
degrowth, postgrowth etc. point out, however, an alternative need not default to some somber 
theory of parsimony contrasted with neoliberalism’s profligacy. It does not demand we 
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conceive the future as a second best joyless existence. Rather it offers the prospect of “just 
transitions”, building a future society and economy reoriented on what really matters to us. 
GNDs already hold out the prospect of redirecting great swathes of socio-economic activity 
from consumption to social, welfare and health services, and there is no law of nature that 
prevents us redirecting attention from consumerism, taking more note of use-value and 
placing greater value on “relational goods” i.e. the sense of well-being derived from 
participation – the relation itself – encompassing a wide variety of activities from the informal 




As psychologists and marketing analysts both note, advertising often works by trying to 
associate a product or service with some primary positive emotion or activity that induces that 
emotion – related to family, friends, conviviality and so on, but it is the intrinsic value of these 
and not the product or service that is indispensable to our well-being. I can be persuaded to 
want a new shirt and might feel good about it and others may complement me on it, but a shirt 
cannot throw a party, tell a joke and will not hold my hand, commiserate, console or offer 
support. Nor can it co-create. Perhaps in the future AI and robotics will add further entities to 
our societies but this does not change the basic point – that we can think differently about 
what we need and value and arguably to do so provides a significant step in addressing some 
of the psycho-social harms of the neoliberal period – what Marxist humanists and sociologists 
refer to as the anxieties of alienation and commodity fetishism and some philosophers as 
status anxiety.
25
 This switch in thinking and preference cannot, however, prevent the anxiety 
of a bill not paid or the consequences that follow from inability to pay what must be paid in a 
system that requires payments. Here various solutions have been offered such as universal 
basic income, but the main point is that we need not think of alternatives to the neoliberal 
period as second best just because they require us to address limits. And this applies not just 
to the global North but also the global South since a less extractive and resource hungry 
global North places fewer pressures on the global South and can be structurally disposed 
along different lines – beginning with “debt jubilee”, a change in asset ownership dynamics 
and the payment of just prices (which should not be conflated with minimal marketised 
versions of “fair trade”).        
 
To do any of these things, however, we need to acknowledge that other worlds are possible, 
which in turn requires us to reject a primary feature of the neoliberal period – the basic tenet 
that “There is No Alternative” (TINA), which operates on the basis of the naturalisation of 
neoliberalism as though it were simply the way things are and how things must be. Still, as I 
suggested in the introduction to this essay the world does not reduce to theory and in the end 
we are interested in the state of the world far more than theory only. “Only” of course is an 
important modifier – since it is important to acknowledge that this is different than “in the 
absence of” – there is no observation, inquiry, understanding, or explanation of the world 
which is uninfluenced by the concatenation of theory that any given commentator has 
previously absorbed, whether explicitly applied to the situation or not. It is also equally 
important to note, given the original subject matter this collection invited us to address – post-
neoliberal economics – that economic theory, in the standard sense, is only one aspect of the 
theory of neoliberalism – albeit one that it is important to unlearn, given the facilitating role it 
has played.  
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Economics facilitating role revisited    
 
When critics of neoliberalism refer to economic theory they usually have in mind a dominant 
disciplinary perspective (for want of a better term “paradigm”) that has multiple effects. A 
primary claim is that it has political significance: its theoretical forms are more conducive to 
some kinds of policy than others and its theoretical forms tends to be more associated with 
some kinds of political views than others. Both claims are arguable and opinion differs. Still, 
critics of neoliberalism have tended to use the term “neoclassical” theory when referring to its 
economics constituent, but typically mean the core of mainstream theory, and as we have 
previously noted, argue that its theoretical form tends to lead to a concept of the state as a 
source of institutional support for markets where they exist and creation of markets where 
they do not. This is premised on the commitment that private interest and competition lead to 
generally beneficial outcomes and while this is underpinned by rational agents, Pareto 
efficiency, perfect competition, general equilibrium etc. mainstream economists recognise the 
world is not quite like this – it is “sub-optimal” – which leads to a variety of further 
theorisations, but crucially one’s that take the ideal as a point of departure or aspiration.  
 
So, the argument is that the nature of economic theory tends to create a policy predisposition 
that favours markets. There may be distortions, frictions, irrationalities and failures but these 
are the market working itself out. Failure may provide some justification for a more 
interventionist approach by the state but even here the dynamism of market failure is usually 
to be preferred to state failure. To a degree then it doesn’t matter if economists think of 
themselves as Right or Left (and surveys tend to indicate many economists consider 
themselves “liberal-leaning” and slightly Left of centre), they work with a theory framework 
that limits the concept of the state (including its complexity as a source of markets if one pays 
attention to the work of Mariana Mazzucato, Neva Goodwin or Jamie Galbraith) and the role 
of the state.  
 
However, critics of neoliberalism hold that the project of neoliberalism also involves activity by 
ideologically motivated economists, which adds an explicit Right wing inflection to its 
economics – and some argument over its relation to mainstream economics, since there are 
numerous methodological differences between Austrians and mainstream economists, as well 
as some political misgivings regarding consequences. The important point critics of 
neoliberalism tend to make here, however, is that economic theory tends to lack adequate 
attention to institutions and power and this creates a vacuum which corporations can fill and 
corporate-disposed Right wing politicians can exploit, a situation – especially where corporate 
funding of politics is unchecked – that leads to a discourse of market efficiencies that runs 
parallel to real markets that are anything but the (efficient) ideal and where corporate interests 
are actively supported by the state – including in forms that Austrians then find offensive 
(corporate welfare, subsidies, tax breaks, tax loopholes, bailouts etc.). Here the concept of 
the market is implicitly politicised in so far as neoliberalism conflates corporate power and 
market activity and speaks about the latter while remaining mainly silent on the former. To be 
clear, there is no reason why a market should favour any given set of interests, but any real 
market is likely to do so, which makes this a significant omission, especially when married 
with degradation of collective power of labour and the financialised activity of owning and 
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As such, though the reality of the neoliberal period and the full panoply of neoliberal theory do 
not reduce to formal economic theory, the nature of economics as theory in the last 40 years 
has still mattered. The implication is that an adequate economics for the future needs to be 
sensitive to the role economics has played within broader social reality. This is different than 
merely suggesting the traditional positive-normative divide is problematic, it is the claim that 
the very nature of theory has political consequences through its methods, exclusions, 
formulations, legitimations and omissions. Learning this requires one to simultaneously 
unlearn the formulation of mainstream economics as “science” (sic) and this is a first step in 
accepting that different kinds of economics are possible and preferable.    
 
 
Post-neoliberal economics  
 
Critique of the nature of mainstream economics significantly predates the current climate 
emergency and climate emergency has not made this critique irrelevant. What climate 
emergency has done, however, is confirm the basic (and already existent) claim that the 
primary insights of ecological economics are fundamental to any adequate economics 
discipline.
27
 Economics must account for the materiality of an economy. This and not 
exchange value are basic to the scale and intensity of economic activity the planet will 
reasonably allow. Thereafter a case can be made that this ecologically premised economics 
must also be normatively sensitive, dialogical and pluralist in so far as these are mutually 
consistent aspects of any adequate approach to economics.  
 
In a short essay there is little that can be said substantively regarding a whole discipline but 
perhaps the best approach is to synthesise and summarise key principles according to the 
kind of concerns that become curricula.
28
 This is something I have done before on behalf of 
the Association for Heterodox Economics (AHE) in response to publication of new curriculum 
guidance in the UK in 2015. As synthesis these points are (again) by no means original 
(Morgan 2015: 535-536):  
 
1. Economics is the study of social provisioning or the different ways in which 
psychological, social and material well-being are and can be achieved through an 
economy. An economy is a historical and dynamic entity and its construction 
necessarily involves institutions and an emergent political framework that fosters 
particular trajectories for that economy. An economy is embedded in an ecology and 
there are material limits to development that cannot be ignored and are central to the 
continued achievement of well-being. Deliberation is fundamental to informed 
decision making at a micro and macro level and so economics is also an ethical 
science. Economics is integral to political processes and so has implications for policy 
and for how citizens live. It is always also political economy.    
 
2. In so far as economics is the study of the social provisioning process, its insights are 
based on different sets of theoretical commitments or emphases. There are then 
many different ways to approach an economic problem and many different ways to 
construct theory and pursue an economic investigation. Economics is therefore 
necessarily pluralistic. Historically it encompasses different schools of thought that 
consider economic problems from different points of view based on different foci, 
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concerns and ultimate aims.  Since economics is deliberative and economies can 
qualitatively change, then there is also an ongoing need to consider new kinds of 
theorisation to consider old problems in new ways, and new problems based on new 
insights. Economics is contested but this is not simply a data issue; it is also an issue 
of the consequences of the dynamics of different approaches to social provisioning. 
Pluralism is ultimately a commitment based on the recognised value for the vitality of 
the discipline of constructive engagement with different approaches to an economic 
problem. It is rooted in the complexity, contingency and malleability of social reality. 
  
3. Social reality is an integrated whole and economics is one way of demarcating an 
aspect of that whole. Its insights ought then to cohere with those of other social 
sciences, and productive interchange between the disciplines is an important way 
each can both inform and temper the claims of the others. It is therefore important 
that economics considers the theories, critiques and methods of other disciplines 
rather than primarily transpose its modes of analysis onto the subjects of other 
disciplines. This is part of what it means to be effective in studying economic 
phenomena in their historical, political, social, institutional and international contexts.   
     
4. Economics is in the broad sense a realist science. It pioritises realism and relevance 
over precision. It recognises that there are many methods that may provide insights 
into an economic problem. It recognises that there are limits to the use of any given 
method. It recognises that an effective economics education develops the ability of an 
economist to understand the limits and potentials of different methods and different 
ways of theorising. In so doing, it recognises that the ability to construct theory, and 
evaluate and use methods, requires a framing context of critical awareness. That 
awareness necessarily requires an economist to be versed in the history of economic 
thought and the progress of economic history. It is also enhanced by the reflexive 
skills provided by the philosophy of economics, including, for example, social 
ontology. Without these, model building, the use of given methods, and of quantitative 
and qualitative data can all too readily be misused. 
 
Clearly these principles need developing, they are not a substantive economics.
29
 Equally 
clearly an ecologically premised, normatively sensitive, dialogical and pluralistic economics is 
very far from the kind of mainstream economics critics of neoliberalism take issue with. The 
challenge is how to transition, but this is a matter of institution building not of expecting the 
impossible. It is about giving participants “reasons to do X”: to debate norms, to accept that 
different points of view informed by different methods and concerns may have justifiable 
bases, to put aside immediate personal interest where appropriate for community goods, to 
work for public understanding of economics, to focus on key real problems of economy, and 
so on – these are choices that can be made not standards that cannot exist or powers no one 
possesses (though this does not prevent disagreement, as for example responses to Geoff 




Moreover, there is a difference between sensitivity to the possible effects of power and 
cynicism regarding inevitable consequences of it. The former is a necessary part of any 
adequate social science while the latter is self-refuting as an academic stance (since what 
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would be the point of engaging in critical reflexive work aimed to contingently improve 
“knowledge” if one held this to be impossible in theory or irrelevant in practice?). 
 
 
From post-neoliberal economics to a post-neoliberal world 
 
Since there is a great deal more to neoliberalism than its economic theory component it would 
be unrealistic to expect a post-neoliberal economics to be capable of producing a post-
neoliberal world without other changes. The economics alone did not produce the current 
adverse state of the world and so changes to the disciplinary form of economics alone cannot 
be expected to resolve the problems of economies writ large. Peter Newell, for example, in 
his recent excellent book Power Shift: The Global Political Economy of Energy Transitions 
makes much this point, albeit mainly implicitly (Newell, 2021). For Newell the world we now 
live in was not created by a failure of pricing mechanisms per se nor lack of available 
technologies early enough to make a difference or even unwillingness to consider alternative 
ways of living, but rather by the systematic pursuit of unsustainability, reproduced because of 
the concentration of power in the hands of key actors and institutions who have continually 





Over the last decade Newell has explored a variety of themes in relation to the need to undo 
the current adverse state of real world economies – the need to avoid “transforismo” or co-
option that undermines or subverts change (greenwashing and so on), the dilemmas of 
“passive revolution” or strategies that advocate gradual change but default to vested 
interest/power preserving strategies that continually fall short of what is needed by deferring 
these into the future according to some rationale. As you may be aware “transforismo” and 
“passive revolution” are terms drawn from Gramsci, one of the Left’s more innovative thinkers 
in regard of the role of ideas and action in effecting change – to which one might add his 
contrast between a war of movement and a war of position. But one does not have to be a 
Marxist to appreciate the point Newell is making – vested interests of the few can have great 
influence over society, and addressing adverse consequences requires some form of strategy 
as praxis. From that point of view, climate emergency means we are all Gramscians now, if 
only as an existential obligation. Newell’s work explores the numerous movements from 
below and policies from above that can coalesce to effect change and makes the case that 
transformative just transitions are the alternative to “transforismo”. In the language of this 
special issue the eventual catastrophe created by a failure to act sufficiently would be a quite 
different and disorderly post-neoliberal world of conflict over diminishing resources in a 
struggle to commodify the final inches of the planet, grind the last rhino horn into aphrodisiac 
and drink the last glass of clean fresh water before the lights go out.     
 
Newell’s work is one among many and parallels that of Clive Spash, Max Koch, Jayeon 
Lindillee and Johanna Olsson in this special issue as well as that of Giorgos Kallis, Julia 
Steinberger, Susan Paulson, Federico Demaria and many others across a host of scholar 
activist and social movements working on a variety of related issues (for example the thorny 
problem of aviation and just transitions in the work of “Stay Grounded”).
32
 Few of these would 
be recognised as “economists” in the disciplinary sense and given the state of the field most 
would actively reject the term. And while one may not agree with all aspects of the 
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concatenation of approaches, this work at least takes Sayer’s “diabolical double crisis” 
seriously. It is political economy for people, a kind of (though I expect not all would embrace 
the term) humanistic economics that is very different than the arid state of the mainstream 
discipline, which awards “Nobel Prizes” for minimal concessions that rational agents might 
have feelings or thoughts or even bodies.
33
      
 
In any case, it should be clear that institution building for a post-neoliberal world surely 
exceeds the scope of institution building for a post-neoliberal economics, though clearly a 
differently conceived economics ought to be performative for a differently conceived 
economy. Equally though, many other disciplines can contribute. For example, George 
Lakoff’s work on persuasive communication strategies (framings) for the environmental 
movement is illuminating – regarding how one constructs alternative messaging themes that 
address the embodied emotive aspect of reasoning (Lakoff, 2010). One need only look to how 
a simple public health issue like wearing a mask can become a politicised issue of identity to 
see how important this can be. Still, communication strategies are just one theme worthy of 
consideration. It also makes sense to consider political dynamics of current leaderships as 
well as impediments created by possible near future events.  
 
In terms of political dynamics, the UK is host to COP 26 and claims a “net zero” leadership 
role. While recognition that something must be done is to be welcomed the current UK 
government is made in its leader’s image: given to grand announcements, absent of actual 
policy, command of fact or consideration of feasibility – a kind of blustering muddling through 
attitude that manifestly pathologically over-promises and under-performs (with one notable if 
important exception in the form of Covid-19 vaccination). While over the last decade the UK 
can claim to have reduced emissions to a significant degree (using production measures) 
based on the transition from coal to gas and now solar and wind, the UK Committee on 
Climate Change make clear that the UK’s future commitments require far more pervasive and 
carefully thought out policy, which the current leadership seem incapable of; this can always 
change, but in the context of the COP process, it seems likely that the UK lacks both moral 
authority and sense of seriousness –  preaching more than it practices, and may thus add 
distraction to “passive revolution” at what is otherwise considered to be a crucial time.       
 
In terms of significant possible near futures one cannot ignore the hostile partisan politics of 
the US. Biden and the Democrats are committed to a Green New Deal future, albeit with 
some struggle over where the emphasis will lie and what the level of financial commitment will 
be. The Republicans or GOP, by contrast, are increasingly trapped in positions that block any 
attempt to address the genuine scale of the climate and ecological challenge. Moreover, 
future leadership dynamics may well destabilise US democracy and (again) disrupt global 
coordination (such that it is) of climate and ecological solutions. Consider the current nature of 
GOP politics and worst case scenarios…  
 
As various commentators have noted, the Democrats’ economic policies have widespread 
support and this extends to some significant proportion of the working class who otherwise 
vote Republican (based on some or all of a higher minimum wage, universal child support/tax 
credits, more funding for health and social care, infrastructure investment, debt alleviation for 
students etc.). GOP politicians, however, continue to be funded and backed by corporate 
interests for whom these policies are anathema and so apart from emphasising fiscal 
conservativism (which is conveniently forgotten when tax cuts are costed or defence spending 
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is mooted) they have been manifestly reluctant to offer their own brand of economics and 
have instead pursued the politics of fear and grievance focused on moral panics regarding 
Black Lives Matter, Antifa, defunding the police, reverse racism and critical race studies (sic) 
curricula in schools, Mr Potato Head, Dr Seuss etc. in order to foster a sense that 
progressives are the enemy within (these woke socialists are coming for your children, your 
guns and your self-respect). The racial overtones of this are hardly new and nor is the 
associated attempt to use the aftermath of Biden’s election and Trump’s defeat to push 
through voter suppression legislation. There is, however, an additional danger here. 
Republican politicians continue to fear Trump’s threat to stand candidates against them and 
rather than organise some kind of solidarity movement to reject him have – with a few 
exceptions whose right wing credentials indicate this has very little to do with whether one is 
authentically Republican –  pledged “loyalty” and thus individually surrendered any sense of 
integrity they had (craven seems the appropriate term here). This loyalty is predicated on 
embracing the “big lie” that widespread voter fraud stole the election and this commits 
Republican politicians to a degenerate domestic politics that depends on and legitimises 
fiction.  
 
The immediate effect is to endorse conspiracy as mainstream, feeding the fantasies of a 
section of the electorate for whom the absence of evidence seems to be all the proof 
required. But the near term worst case effect is potentially more sinister. Should Trump stand 
and despite voter suppression (as opposed to trying to win votes) and the politics of fear, lose 
again it is not inconceivable that different states or Congress will take action to put aside the 
vote. Trump, of course, may not stand and may end up in prison, so all of this is highly 
speculative – but the dynamics of Trumpism, the rejection of both integrity and reality are not 
easily reversed for the Right. And this can only destabilise checks and balances within US 
politics and place a drag on effective policy being made there – exacerbating existing 
problems of the Rightward shift in the Supreme Court and the block created by the filibuster in 
a hostile partisan Senate and divided country. Clearly, a preoccupied and divided America 
and a possible return to a pariah US administration do not bode well in a time of climate 
emergency. The world does not need wrecking ball politics of this kind and one wonders what 
the ultimate consequences might be when/if a political system embraces fiction and becomes 
suppressive of and hostile to truth, expertise and common sense. It certainly did not end well 
for the Soviet Union.   
 
The US of course is not the major emitter on the planet now, and one also cannot ignore 
China’s near term future. Richard Smith’s China’s Engine of Environmental Collapse (Smith, 
2020) is an indispensable guide to China’s political economy. It provides a relentless and 
distressing litany of statistics that speak to imminent eco-Armageddon. And it makes clear 
that this is not just a matter of adverse globalised structures of economy (production for 
export that has essentially offshored the emissions of other countries) but also the internal 
dynamics of authoritarian state policy, dysfunctional regional devolved powers, adverse 
incentives and massive corruption. Emissions and other ecological problems of resource use, 
pollution and waste in China far exceed its proportion of the global economy and there are 
recognised widespread problems of overproduction and overconsumption, much of it led by 
building of superfluous cities, unnecessary airports, roads and rail networks. Smith paints a 
very different picture of China’s economic miracle than one might glean from contextless 
statistics drawn from the World Bank database.  
 
So, China seems currently trapped in its own growth imperatives, and from the point of view 
of climate emergency, possible near futures in East Asia are no less potentially febrile than 
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those on the other side of the Pacific and likely more so.
34
 As things stand, great power rivalry 
seems to be a struggle over the wrong goals – a pissing contest of you show me your 
economy, I’ll show you mine. Though both the US and China are keen to own the future via 
mastering the next generation of “sustainable” technologies it is far from clear that the context 
of technological dependencies has or will liberate itself from problems of expansion and scale. 
And mention of technological dependencies is a reminder that it may, of course, not be 
countries that have the final word here, if we turn full circle and return to one of 
neoliberalism’s most prominent features – extreme wealth inequality. There are a few 
individuals on the planet now who have assets and influence that exceeds that of most 
countries. Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk made their fortunes via technological disruption 
(leavened in the former case by harsh employment practices and in the latter by judicious 
moves to oust incumbent management) and both have grand visions of technofix futures. 
Technology has become theatre for the very rich, as pet projects to control space exploration 
indicate. For some this is sinister distraction in which collective dystopia becomes utopic 
fantasy – a potential exit planet left for the very wealthy. While this seems unduly cynical it is 
a reminder that much of the future is still in the hands of a few, and this is quintessentially 
neoliberal. In any case, unlearning mainstream/neoliberal economics is just one strand in a 
grand existential challenge and as the preceding comments indicate, we may yet be trapped 





In his massive novel In Search of Lost Time, Proust ruminates that we are, objectively, aware 
that everyone dies, but the way we live depends on delusion that rejects this truth. More 
generally, as anyone who pays attention to the world around them is aware our civilisations 
have become accustomed to thinking that time is something we always have more of. This is 
a curious facet of the nature of our being. As a sentient species we are time travellers in a 
whole host of ways. Our species’ intelligence has been built round the pursuit of collective 
control of our environment and security seeking. We do not simply encounter the future 
passively, we reason, imagine, anticipate and plan and we do so at various scales and over 
different timelines. This tendency, however, has always had its problems and limits and this is 
still the case today. On the one hand, capitalism fosters powerful interest groups and 
neoliberalism may have honed this feature, but equally we delegate our fate to marketised 
systems where we assume adequate solutions are emergent properties. As such we have 
created a system of parts with no directing centre demonstrably able to bring the whole to 
heel. On the other hand, though we are a species who places great store in our capacities to 
master the world around us and create the future, we have a poor track record when it comes 
to predicting the future. Our combined activities continually confound our most confident 
claims that we understand how things are and how they will be.  
 
As philosophers such as Tony Lawson have long noted, mainstream economics has been at 
the cutting edge of ignorance in so far as it has provided the social science template for 
inadequate modelling and theorisation of control, (over-)confidence and prediction.
35
 This 
takes various forms: model worlds of repetitive equilibriums whose quantification of variables 
slices complexity into well-defined relations that reduce temporality to periodised repetition; 
stylised patterned path-dependencies that treat structurally constrained and enabled activity 
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as deterministic fait accompli (albeit often with a stochastic twist), and so on. As critics have 
noted many times, economics works with notoriously poor conceptions of human being and 
its active consequences in the world and this is combined with inadequate theorisation of time 
–  not clock time per se, rather the way things happen in reality through or in time because of 
who we are collectively and what we can do (subject to the limits imposed by a material 
world). Economics has steadfastly resisted addressing these problems as anything other than 
piecemeal adjustments, when what is required is a fundamentally different way of proceeding. 
This ironically is a path-dependent problem, in so far as economics has committed itself to a 
version of quantification as science built around its core axioms and methods. As John Latsis, 
for example, has recently argued an Economic Process Theory would approach the problem 
quite differently (Latsis, 2015). Latsis draws on the metaphysics of the American pragmatist 
philosopher Nicholas Rescher and the work of Shackle, but there are numerous other 
contributors (beginning with Veblen, Keynes and Knight) who have considered the features of 




An economics theorised and pursued in terms of generative sources of active processes 
leading to cumulative causation, contingency, diversity, novelty, surprise, transitions and 
transformations is quite different than the one we have now. It is an approach to systems that 
is alive to uncertainty and by its very nature introduces a degree of epistemic humility into 
economics that it has so obviously lacked in practice. Such an economics, for example, might 
have provided different guidance over the last forty years than the Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAMs) pioneered by William Nordhaus.
37
 It is because of blithe commitment to 
“business-as-usual” that we now face a planetary scale problem which comes up against the 
problems of how we have treated the future. New coordination seems needed at the planetary 
scale and with it perhaps a kind of cultural leap or civilisational learning that takes us past the 
contradictions of capitalism and parochialism of countries as we know them, just as in the 
past countries transcended city states. Planetary scale democracy according to thinkers such 
as Heikki Patomäki, would be a progressive variant of post-neoliberalism.
38
 We might think 
this unlikely, but it is worth noting that our intentional activity is the only way we have of 
rationally connecting the past to the present and the future. We cannot perhaps predict, but 
that does not abnegate responsibility for prudential enlightened conduct. And a planetary 
scale post-neoliberal future is no more inconceivable now than market society was prior to its 
birth at (as Polanyi reminds us) the hands of the state. Its existence would defy no law of 
nature and to those living in it, it would no doubt feel as natural as any other historical period 
has felt.       
 
Ultimately, economics can continue to be part of the problem or it can be a constructive part 
of addressing those problems – but to do so – it must play its part in carrying the population 
with it. This does not imply, to reiterate a previous point, that everyone is equally responsible 
for the state of the world, but it does recognise that for minorities to pillage the world 
majorities must be disempowered or duped or both. Decisions are going to have to be made 
irrespective and these can either favour the few or the many, can work with the impossible or 
accept the highly likely. If the latter then we need to start thinking about previously 
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unpalatable issues – doing less, reducing scales, filling time in other ways, thinking about 
different ways of organising an economy. This then raises a whole set of issues regarding 
what really matters to us and feasible distributions on not just a national but a global scale. 
These are issues that the COP process of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement barely 
touch (beyond some focus on financing for adaptation and mitigation). Dialogue over norms 
can involve and carry the majority or it can collapse into fragmented and defensive articulation 
of interests, preservation of power and conflict. Economics, clearly, is just one area where the 
former (“carry”) is possible but not currently likely and the latter (“collapse”) seems to be 
where the world is currently headed.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that “life after neoliberalism” invokes a concatenation of abuses that 
ought to be absented and transitions that must be effected, which we have not had the 
opportunity to discuss: a system that stops taking from the global South, an end to modern 
forms of slavery (which have proved quite compatible with global capitalism), 
definancialisation, the liberation from work (where appropriate) rather than the denial of 
employment. These kinds of wish lists emerge from any balance sheet of neoliberalism, they, 
however, are more than wishful thinking. There is a well-known aphorism widely attributed to 
the philosopher and novelist George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it”. A future that mirrors the past, however, is now neither possible nor 
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Bittlingmayer, U. Demirović, A. and Freya, T. (eds) Handbuch Kritische Theorie (Handbook of Critical 
Theory). Springer 
Jo, T. H., Chester, L. and D’ippolita, C. (eds.) (2018) The Routledge Handbook of Heterodox 
Economics: Theorizing, Analyzing and Transforming Capitalism. London: Routledge.  
Kallis, G. (2018a) In Defence of Degrowth: Opinions and Manifestos. Uneven Earth Press.  
Kallis, G. (2018b) Degrowth. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Agenda Publishing. 
Kallis, G. Paulson, S. D’Alisa G. and Demaria, F. (2020) The Case for Degrowth. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Keen, S. (2020) “The appallingly bad Neoclassical Economics of climate change.” Globalizations, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1807856  
Keen, S. and Morgan, J. (2021) “From finance to climate crisis: An interview with Steve Keen.” Real-
World Economics Review, 95: 130-147,  
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue95/KeenMorgan95.pdf.  
Lakoff, G. (2010) “Why it matters how we frame the environment.” Environmental Communication 4(1): 
70-81. 
Latsis, J. (2015) “Shackle on time, uncertainty and process.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 39 (4): 
1149-1165. 
Lawson, T. and Morgan, J. (2021a) “Cambridge social ontology, the philosophical critique of modern 
economics and social positioning theory: an interview with Tony Lawson, part 1.” Journal of Critical 
Realism 20(1): 72-97. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2020.1846009 
Lawson, T. and Morgan, J. (2021b) “Cambridge social ontology, the philosophical critique of modern 
economics and social positioning theory: an interview with Tony Lawson, part 1.” Journal of Critical 
Realism 20(2): 201-237.  https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2021.1914904 
real-world economics review, issue no. 96 
subscribe for free 
 
26 
Lee, F. and Cronin, B. (eds.) (2016) Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Heterodox 
Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781782548454/9781782548454.00007.xml 
 
Mearman, A. Berger, S. and Guizzo, D. (2018a) “Whither political economy? Evaluating the CORE 
project as a response to calls for change in economics teaching.” Review of Political Economy 30 (2): 
241-259. 
Mearman, A. Berger, S. and Guizzo, D. (2018b) “Is UK economics teaching changing? Evaluating the 
new subject benchmark statement.” Review of Social Economy 76 (3): 377-396.  
Mirowski, P. (2013) Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste: How Neoliberalism survived the Financial 
Meltdown. Verso: London  
Mirowski, P. and Plewhe, Mirowski, Philip/Plehwe, Dieter (eds.) (2015) The Road from Mont Pelerin: the 
Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.   
Morgan, J. (2021) “A critique of the Laffer theorem’s macro-narrative consequences for corporate tax 
avoidance from a Global Wealth Chain perspective.” Globalizations 18 (2): 174-194. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1760420   
Morgan, J. (2020a) “Degrowth: necessary, urgent and good for you.” Real-World Economics Review 93: 
113-131. http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue93/Morgan93.pdf   
Morgan, J. (2020b) “Electric Vehicles: The future we made and the problem of unmaking it.” Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 44(4): 953-977.  https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beaa022  
Morgan, J. (2019) “Will we work in twenty-first century capitalism? A critique of the fourth industrial 
revolution literature.” Economy and Society 48 (3): 371-398. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2019.1620027    
Morgan, J. (2018) “Species being in the twenty-first century.” Review of Political Economy 30 (3): 377-
395. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2018.1498583 
Morgan. J. (2015) “Is economics responding to critique? What do the UK QAA 2015 Subject 
Benchmarks for Economics indicate?” Review of Political Economy, 27(4): 518-538. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2015.1084774 
Morgan, J. and Nasir, A. (2021) “Financialised Private Equity Finance and the Debt Gamble: The Case 
of Toys R Us.” New Political Economy 26 (3): 455-471. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2020.1782366   
Nelson, J. and Morgan, J. (2020) “Ecological and feminist economics: an interview with Julie A. Nelson.” 
Real-World Economics Review, 91: 146-153,  
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue91/NelsonMorgan91.pdf   
Newell, P. (2021) Power Shift: The Global Political Economy of Energy Transitions. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Parrique, T. Barth, J. Briens, F. Kerschner, C. Kraus-Polk, A. Kuokkanen, A. and Spangenberg, J. H. 
(2019) Decoupling debunked. European Environmental Bureau.  
https://eeb.org/library/decoupling-debunked/    
Ripple, W. Wolf, C. Newsome, T. Barnard, P. Moomaw, W. (2021) “The climate emergency: 2020 in 




Patomäki, H. (2011) “Towards global political parties.” Ethics & Global Politics 4 (2): 81-102.  
Peck, J. (2013) “Explaining (with) neoliberalism.” Territory, Politics, Governance 1(2): 132-157.  
Pinker, S. (2012) The Angels of our Better Nature: A history of violence and humanity. London: Penguin.     
Rescher, N. (1996) Process Metaphysics. New York: State University of New York Press. 
Rescher, N. (1998) Predicting the Future. New York: State University of New York Press. 
real-world economics review, issue no. 96 
subscribe for free 
 
27 
Rescher, N. and Morgan, J. (2020) “Philosophical purpose and purposive philosophy: An interview with 
Nicholas Rescher.” Journal of Critical Realism 19 (1): 58-77.    
Sayer, A. (2015) Why we can’t afford the rich. Bristol: Policy Press.  
Smith, R. (2020) China’s Engine of Environmental Collapse. London: Pluto Press. 
Spash, C. (ed.) (2017) Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics: Nature and Society. New York: 
Routledge.  
Spash, C. (2020) “Apologists for growth: passive revolutionaries in a passive revolution.” Globalizations 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1824864  
Stay Grounded (2021) “A Rapid and Just Transition of Aviation.” https://stay-grounded.org/just-
transition/   
Steffen, W. and Morgan, J. (2021) “From the Paris Agreement to the Anthropocene and Planetary 
Boundaries Framework: An interview with Will Steffen.” Globalizations,  
https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2021.1940070  
Syll, L. P. and Morgan, J. (2019) “Realism and critique in economics: An interview with Lars P. Syll.” 
Real-World Economics Review, 88: 60-75, 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue87/SyllMorgan88.pdf   
Wade, R. (2020) “Rethinking the world economy as a two bloc hierarchy.” Real-World Economics 
Review, 92: 4-21, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue92/Wade92.pdf 
 
Weber, H. (2017) “Politics of ‘Leaving No One Behind’: Contesting the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals Agenda.” Globalizations 14(3): 399-414. 








Morgan, Jamie (2021) “The future: Thanks for the memories.” real-world economics review, issue no. 96, 22 July, pp. 
2-27, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue96/Morgan96.pdf 
 
You may post and read comments on this paper at https://rwer.wordpress.com/comments-on-rwer-issue-no-96/ 
